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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
EVELYN MUIR,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.

No. 940553-CA

APACHE NITROGEN PRODUCTS and
W.H. BURT EXPLOSIVES,

(Priority No. 15)

Defendants/Appellees,
v.
DOUGLAS BAILEY,
Third-Party Defendant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE APACHE NITROGEN PRODUCTS

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Seventh Judicial District Court of Grand County, Utah.

The Court of Appeals

has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(k) .
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Plaintiff filed suit in Grand County and, after sig-

nificant work had been done in the trial court, sought to have
venue changed to Davis County.

Did the lower court abuse its

discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for change of venue?
Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that the trial court's decision on
this issue is reviewed for correctness.

Rather, "[a]n applica-

tion for a change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court, and its action will not be disturbed except
for an abuse of discretion."
P. 816, 822 (1929).

Winters v. Turner, 74 Utah 222, 278

Cf. State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 551 (Utah

1989) (criminal case).
2.

Does the record on appeal demonstrate a reasonable ba-

sis in the evidence upon which a jury could have found in plaintiff's favor on her negligence and breach of warranty claims?
The standard of review of the trial court's directed verdict on
these issues "is the same as that imposed upon the trial court.
We must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the
losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence
and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a
judgment in favor of the losing party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained."

Management Committee of Graystone Pines Home-

owners Association v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 898
(Utah 1982).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
The venue issue is controlled by Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-8,
which provides:
If the county in which the action is commenced is
not the proper county for the trial thereof, the action
may nevertheless be tried therein, unless the defendant
at the time he answers or otherwise appears files a motion, in writing, that the trial be had in the proper
county.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action for wrongful death and products liability
arising out of an explosives accident.

(R. 1-15.)

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Following an appeal of a prior order of the trial court,
Muir v. W.H. Burt Explosives, Inc., 851 P.2d 645 (Utah 1993),
this case was tried to a jury on January 24 through 28, 1994.
The court directed a verdict in favor of defendant Apache (and
later, defendant Burt) on the negligence and breach of warranty
claims.

(R. 1511-12.)

The jury returned a special verdict find-

ing that the product in question was not defective.
65.)

(R. 1163-

The court entered judgment on the special verdict on Febru-

ary 14, 1994.
March 10, 1994.

(R. 1190-91.)

The notice of appeal was filed

(R. 1211.)
Statement of Facts

This case arises out of an explosion of dynamite in which
plaintiff's decedent, Wallace A. Muir, was killed and third-party
defendant Douglas Bailey was injured.

Plaintiff's primary claim

was that the fuse Muir and Bailey were using was "fast;" in other
words, that it burned at a faster rate than normal.

Plaintiff

also asserted breach of warranty and negligent failure to warn,
but presented no evidence on those issues.
that the fuse was not defective.
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The jury determined

(R. 1190-91.)

Defendant Apache was the manufacturer of the fuse, and defendant Burt was the retail seller of the fuse and dynamite.
On September 5, 1986, Wallace Muir and Douglas Bailey were
searching for a fabled Spanish gold mine in the Uinta mountains
of Duchesne County.

They were blasting a short tunnel perpen-

dicular to the main tunnel.

They were using dynamite, blasting

caps (more appropriately called "fuse detonators"), safety fuse,
and ammonium nitrate fuel oil (called "ANFO" or "prill").

ANFO

is an insensitive explosive which is detonated by dynamite.
Bailey was trained and licensed as a blaster by the State of
California in 1982, following more than 40 hours of instruction
and two days of testing.

(R. 1347-48.)

Muir was relying upon

Bailey's experience and training as a blaster.

(R. 1464.)

Safety fuse looks like stiff, quarter-inch diameter cord.
It consists of a fine cotton center thread, surrounded by a very
small amount of black powder.
powder.

Jute threads are spun around the

Around the jute, cotton threads are spun in the opposi-

tion direction.

This core is covered by layers of asphalt, plas-

tic, more windings of cotton threads and paraffin wax.

When the

fuse is lit, the flame travels down the interior of the fuse, out
of sight.

(R. 1582-83, 1617-25; Ex. 18.)

American safety fuse burns unconfined at sea level at 40
seconds per foot, plus or minus ten percent.

The burn rate can

be affected by a number of factors, including elevation, age of
the fuse, storage and treatment of the fuse, confinement of the

-4-

fuse, etc.

For this reason, fuse manufacturers and sellers make

no representation or warranty regarding the burn speed of fuse.
Bailey was aware of this from reading the DuPont Blaster's Handbook.

(R. 1387-89.)

Muir purchased a copy of the handbook with

the explosives. (R. 1342-43.)
Fuse detonators are thin-walled aluminum tubes, approximately two inches long, and slightly more than a quarter inch in
diameter.

One end is open.

Safety fuse fits snugly into the

open end of the detonator and is crimped in place.
Bailey and Muir were using nitroglycerin-based dynamite
sticks, one inch in diameter and 8 inches long.

The fuse detona-

tor, which is crimped to the fuse (a fuse crimped to a detonator
is called a "primer" (R. 1557)) is pushed into the dynamite by
poking a hole in the stick of dynamite with the pointed handle of
the crimper, and inserting the detonator into the soft material
inside the dynamite stick.
Bore holes 1H inch in diameter were drilled four feet deep
into the "face," or surface of the rock that was to be blasted
away.

In general practice, the dynamite with the detonator in-

side is eased into the bore holes, either to the back of the
hole, or after one or more "cushion" sticks of dynamite are first
loaded into the hole.

(R. 1735-37.)

A special pneumatic gun is

used to fill the bore holes with the small pellets of ANFO.

-5-

When a fuse is lit the flame burns internally to the detonator, blowing the detonator, which in turn detonates the dynamite,
which in turn detonates the ANFO.
Rock is relatively strong when stressed in compression, and
relatively weak when stressed in extension.

If all of the

charges are equally spaced and explode at the same time, the rock
is stressed in compression and will not break properly.

The

holes must be drilled in a particular pattern, and the charges
must be carefully timed to explode in sequence.

(R. 1380-82.)

A

series of charges is call a "round."
Bailey testified that on this round he drilled four bore
holes in the center of the face, a few inches apart, in a square
pattern.

He loaded these holes with charges.

There was an empty

hole in the middle of these four loaded holes so the rock could
break into the hole.

This pattern of four holes surrounding an

empty hole he called the "burn." He placed four loaded holes,
which he called the "box," around the "burn" and then approximately 20 other charges at increasing distance from the center.
He testified that he timed the explosions so the burn would go
first, then the box, then the other charges in sequence to break
toward the increasingly large gap in the center of the face. He
told MSHA investigators a different story.

He told MSHA investi-

gators there were 4 or 5 vertical burn holes and every other one
was loaded.

(R. 1380-81, 1559, 1562.)
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Bailey claims that all the fuses were equal in length and
that he timed the blasts by the order in which he lit them.

In

other words, the stick attached to the first fuse he lit would
explode first, then the next, and so on.

Originally he claimed

the fuses were bH feet long. After seeing the unused primers recovered by MSHA, he claimed he used 6H foot fuses.

(R. 1400-04,

1427-29.)
Bailey testified he made up primers one round in advance.
(R. 1396-97.)

When miners light individual fuses, often the

fuses are cut to different lengths to provide the required firing
sequencing.

(R. 1392, 1711-21, 1726.)

ered 28 unused primers from the mine.

MSHA investigators recovThree primers were 42

inches in length, four primers were 60 inches in length, and
twenty-one primers were 79 inches in length.

This is consistent

with primers cut for the next round where the timing was provided
by different lengths of fuse.

If Bailey trimmed the fuses to

different lengths for timing, the burn fuses were 42 inches. A
42-inch fuse, unconfined at sea level, will burn for approximately 2 minutes and 20 seconds, plus or minus ten percent.
Bailey used a "spitter fuse" to light the charge fuses. He
took a piece of fuse 63 inches long and "notched" it along 42
inches of the length by cutting it nearly through every inch or
so.

(R. 1404-09; Ex. 5.)

He lit the spitter. As the flame

reached a notch it would emit a brief "spit" of flame.
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He held

the spitter to the charge fuses and used the spits of flame to
ignite the charge fuses in the bore holes.
Bailey used the spitter fuse as a timing device.

He in-

tended that when the flame reached the end of the spitter it
would be time to leave the mine.

He testified that it was his

practice to cut the spitter fuse about a foot shorter than the
shortest charge fuses.

When the spitter stopped burning he would

have one minute to leave the mine before the charges started exploding.

In this case he was confused about the length of the

spitter.

(R. 1425-37.)

If Bailey used 5^ foot fuses as he claimed, the spitter was
virtually the same length as the shortest charge fuse.

If, as

the unused primers recovered by MSHA suggest, the burn fuses were
42 inches, the notched portion of the spitter was the same length
as the shortest charge fuse.
The mine was dark and filling with smoke from the fuses.
(R. 1440-41, 1416-17.)
14.)

Muir knew it.

Bailey was impaired by alcohol. (R. 1807-

(R. 2073-74.)

two fuses in the round.

Bailey had trouble lighting

He had to stop, cut the ends off those

two fuses with a pocket knife, and try again to light them.
(R. 1565-67, 1438-40.)

The spitter was burning down.

Before

Bailey could light the last fuse he shouted to Muir to "get the
hell out!"

(R. 1440, 1567.)

Muir was not struck by one premature blast, but rather was
struck by at least two separate blasts in very rapid succession.
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The first blast struck him the head and chest, killing him instantly and spinning him around.
the back before he fell.
the round going off.
ture detonation.

The second blast struck him in

(R. 1838-45.)

This is consistent with

It is not consistent with a single, prema-

Moreover, had the first explosion occurred any-

where but the burn, evidence in the form of poor breakage of the
rock would have been left.

The rock was broken clean.

(R. 1600-

04.)
It was physically impossible for the accident to have been
caused by fast fuse.

(R. 1582-93, 1626-84, 1706.)

Quality control records for all of the fuse sold to Burt in
the seven months before this fuse was sold to Muir and Bailey
show that all of that fuse burned within specifications.

The

fuse in question was likely part of the fuse sold to Burt in that
period of time.

(R. 1739-41, 1705-06, 1827-28.)

Walt Leidner worked for Apache from 1977 to 1989 as a technical service engineer, addressing customers' concerns or questions.

Apache made between 13 and 15 million feet of safety fuse

in 1977. By 1989 Apache made between 1.5 to 2 million feet of
safety fuse.

During that 13-year period Mr. Leidner never had

any reason to believe that fuse that burned faster than specification ever left the factory.

(R. 1727-34, 1751-52.)

Bailey and Muir purchased half of a roll of fuse.

The other

half was sold to David Jones, an experienced miner who testified
that the fuse burned properly.

(R. 1754-64/ Ex. 53.)
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Bailey tested the fuse before using it and he found it
burned properly.

(R. 1399-1400.)

MSHA inspectors tested unused

fuse recovered from the area of the mine and found it burned
properly.

(R. 1569-70.)

MSHA inspectors found no evidence of fast fuse.

They con-

cluded that the fuses used were too short for minimum safety.
(R. 1572, 1578-79.)
The claim that Bailey and Muir lacked adequate instruction
or direction concerning the use of explosives is not supported by
any evidence in the record.

MSHA inspectors who investigated the

accident found that the "accident resulted from the total lack of
knowledge of or respect for the explosives used."
(emphasis added).)

(R. 1577-78

It was stated in the alternative.

The evi-

dence conclusively established that it was respect for explosives
that Bailey and Muir lacked, not knowledge.
It is undisputed that BaiLey was a hard rock miner with 20
years experience.

Every box of dynamite sold since he started

mining contained a copy of a "Warnings and Instructions" pamphlet
(Ex. 8), commonly referred to as the "Dofs and Don't's," which is
a small booklet of uniform warnings and instructions adopted by
the Institute of Makers of Explosives.

Every box of detonators

contains a copy of the Do's and Don'ty s.

Every box of Apache

fuse contains a copy of the Do's and Don't's.
1348-1349, Ex. 8.)

(R. 1340-1342,

Muir and Bailey purchased at least one box of
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dynamite and one box of detonators.

Ex. 6.

They had at least

two copies of the Do's and Don't's.
Bailey was very familiar with the Do's and Don't's. When he
worked with green miners he required them to study the Do's and
Don't's.

The Do's and Don't's were discussed during safety meet-

ings at the mines where Bailey worked.

(R. 1340-1342, 1424.)

Bailey was aware of the fact that a blaster should always follow
the Do's and Don't's.

(R. 1342.)

Bailey and Muir violated many of the warnings and instructions contained in the Do's and Don't's.

First, they had at

least 28 more primers prepared than they needed.

The Do's and

Don't's warn against that practice:
USING EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR
PRIMERS
GENERAL
• Never prepare more primers than immediately
needed.
(Ex. 8, p. 6.)

Having extra primers of different lengths sitting

around creates the risk that a short fuse may be used by mistake
in a dark mine.

Just before this round Bailey expressed confu-

sion about the length of the fuses.

(R. 1816-1817.)

Bailey and Muir also lit fuses directly in front of the
blast face.

The Do's and Don't's warn against this practice as

well:
USING EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS: GENERAL PRECAUTIONS
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• Always fire the shot from a position
outside
the blast area away from an area where flyrock
might occur.

• Never fire the shot from in front
(Ex. 8, p. 10 (emphasis in original).)

of the blast.

If safety fuse and fuse

detonators are used, firing the blast means lighting the fuses.
(R. 1409-1410.)

A safe location for firing the blast was ap-

proximately 16 or 17 feet away, around a corner from the blast
face.

(R. 1409-11, 1597-1600/ Ex. 12, 13.)
In addition, Bailey and Muir attempted to manually light 25

to 30 sticks of dynamite in less than three minutes.

The Do's

and Don't's specifically warn against this practice as well, and
require the use of igniter cord with thermalite connectors:
USING EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS: FUSE DETONATOR AND SAFETY
FUSE INITIATION

STEPS FOR ASSEMBLING FUSE DETONATOR AND FUSE

Step 3:
Measure correct length of fuse from roll
and cut squarely across with a fuse cutter designed for this purpose; not a
knife.

LIGHTING SAFETY FUSE
Step 1:
Make sure you can reach a safe location
after lighting with sufficient time before initiation.
Step 2:
Place sufficient stemming over the explosive material to protect it from fuse-generated
heat and sparks.
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Step 3:
Have a partner before lighting the fuse.
One person should light the fuse, and the other
should time and monitor the burn.
Step 4:
Light the safety fuse, using a specially
designed lighter:
Single-fuse
ignition - hot wire lighters,
pull-wire lighters or thermalite connectors.
Multiple-fuse
ignition - igniter cord with
thermalite connectors.
• Always light fuse with a fuse lighter designed
for the purpose.
• Always use the "buddy system" when lighting
safety fuse - one lights the fuse, the other
times and monitors.

• Never use matches, cigarette
lighters,
rettes,
pipes,
cigars,
carbide lamps,
unsafe means to ignite safety fuse.

cigaor other

(Ex. 8, pp. 13-15 (emphasis in original).)
Igniter cord connectors look much like fuse detonators.
They are crimped onto the end of the fuse opposite the detonators, outside the bore hole.

Igniter cord looks something like

fine wires and threads spun around a partially exposed one eighth
inch diameter core of material.

When it is lit, an unconfined

flame burns down the igniter cord at a relatively uniform rate,
usually 10 seconds per foot (other speeds are available).

The

igniter cord is strung from a location of safety to each of the
igniter cord connectors in the order in which the charges are to
be detonated.

The connectors have a small metal tab on the end.

The igniter cord is placed under the tab, and the tab is bent
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down onto the cord to hold it in place.

From a location of safe-

ty, the igniter cord is lit with a match and the miner retreats.
When the flame reaches a connector, flammable material inside the
connector is ignited.

This creates an intense flame directed at

the end of the fuse, lighting the fuse.

As the flame travels

along the cord from connector to connector, the safety fuses are
lit in order while the miner waits in safety outside the mine.
Bailey was very familiar with, and experienced in, the use
of igniter cord and connectors, as well as other available methods for remote detonation.
these systems.
about costs.

He discussed the pros and cons of

They were not used because Muir was concerned
(R. 1359-65, 1374-79, 1411, 1420.)

Bailey admits

that had igniter cord and connectors, or Nonels or electric detonators been used to fire the round from a position of safety,
Wallace Muir would still be alive.

(R. 1411-12.)

An approved lighting device must also be used.
has only a very small amount of black powder.

Safety fuse

An inappropriate

lighting method can cause the asphalt, plastic, and wax to melt
and cover the powder before the powder is ignited.
1701.)

A spitter fuse is not an approved method.

(R. 1698(R. 1575.)

Bailey was familiar with MSHA regulations regarding blasting.

He generally made it a practice to follow those minimum

safety rules even when MSHA did not have jurisdiction.

He vio-

lated a fair number of these minimum safety standards.

For exam-

ple, MSHA regulations stated that a maximum of 15 fuses could be
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lit by hand.

Under the regulations a spitter is not an approved

lighting device.

(R. 1345-47, 1572-75, 1463-64.)

Finally, while Muir was watching Bailey light the fuses, he
was not timing the process.

(R. 1416.)

This also violated the

Do's and Don't's.
In addition to the Do's and Don't's, Muir purchased a copy
of the DuPont Blaster's Handbook.

(R. 1342-43.)

miliar with the DuPont Blaster's Handbook.
eral times before this accident.

Bailey was fa-

He had read it sev-

(R. 1342-43.)

Bailey knew well

before this accident that the Blaster's Handbook said it was necessary to use igniter cord and connectors when lighting more than
one fuse.

(R. 1387.)

The Do's and Don't's and the DuPont Blaster's Handbook are
nationally recognized sources for instructions on the safe use of
explosives.

(R. 1727-35.)

When Bailey received his training, he

studied and was tested on the Do's and Don't's.

(R. 1347-48.)

In summary, Bailey, who was impaired by alcohol, and Muir
tried to light 25 to 30 sticks of dynamite in a dark, smoky mine,
having trouble lighting fuses, in less than three minutes.

They

knowingly rejected multiple instructions and warnings to use igniter cord and igniter cord connectors, or another system which
would have allowed them to fire the round from a safe position.
There is no evidence in the record of defect in the fuse, breach
of warranty, or inadequacy in the warnings or instructions.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The decision to grant or deny a change of venue rests

within the sound discretion of the trial court.

The trial court

did not abuse its discretion in this case.
A.

Grand County was the principal place of business

of defendant Burt and was thus a proper venue for trial.

Utah

Code Ann. § 78-13-7.
B.

A change of venue must be requested in the first

pleading filed by a party.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-8.

Plaintiff

selected venue in Grand County by filing the complaint there.
She prosecuted the case in Grand County for 18 months prior to
the first appeal.
change venue.

After the case was remitted, she moved to

Even if the plaintiff did not waive the venue ob-

jection by filing the case in Grand County, she certainly waived
it by prosecuting the case there for 18 months.

Pace v. Wolfe,

76 Utah 368, 289 P. 1102, 1103 (1930).
C.

Plaintiff requested that venue be changed to Davis

County, yet Davis County was not a proper venue for trial of the
case.

The available choices were Grand County, where Burt f s

principal place of business was, or Duchesne County, where the
accident occurred.

The trial court could not have granted plain-

tiff's motion to change venue to Davis County even if the motion
had been timely.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7.
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II.

The trial court acted properly in directing the verdict

in defendants' favor on the failure to warn and breach of implied
warranty claims.
A.

Plaintiff has failed to supply the court with a

transcript of the evidence which she claims supports the claims.
Her entire statement of facts is taken from the MSHA report of
its investigation of the accident.

(Ex. 38.)

There is no evi-

dence in the record on appeal from which the court could determine that there was a reasonable basis in the evidence to support
a judgment in plaintiff's favor on those claims. Absent an appropriate record, this court must presume the correctness of the
trial court's ruling.

State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150, 152-53

(Utah App. 1992).
B.

The record on appeal shows no failure to warn.

The defendants had no duty to warn Bailey and Muir of the obvious
danger of attempting to manually light 25 to 30 sticks of dynamite within a period of three minutes. Moreover, extensive and
comprehensive warnings were given to, and ignored by, Bailey and
Muir.
C.

The record on appeal shows no breach of the im-

plied warranty of merchantability.
anything was wrong with the fuse.

There was no evidence that
Plaintiff simply asked the

court to permit the jury to speculate that, because the dynamite
exploded before Bailey finished lighting the last stick, there
may have been some problem with the fuse.
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The trial court cor-

rectly refused to permit the jury to engage in such unsubstantiated speculation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S BELATED REQUESTS FOR
CHANGE OF VENUE.
Plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in denying her
motion to change venue from Grand County to Davis County.

Plain-

tiffs' argument should be rejected because Grand County was an
appropriate venue for trial and because plaintiff herself selected Grand County by initially filing the case there.1
Plaintiff erroneously argues that the trial court's decision
on this issue is a decision on a question of law reviewable for
correctness.

Utah law is well settled that "[a]n application for

a change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court, and its action will not be disturbed except for an
abuse of discretion."
816, 822 (1929).

Winters v. Turner, 74 Utah 222, 278 P.

Cf. State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 551 (Utah

1989) (criminal case).

In the case at bar, plaintiff initially

selected Grand County by filing her case there, and the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to
change venue.
1

Plaintiff's brief misleadingly suggests that present counsel, Mr. Copier,
did not appear in the case until the appeal of the initial dismissal of the
case. (Appellant's brief, at 17.) That is not the case. Mr. Copier represented plaintiff on every pleading filed in Case No. 5873 (R. 1) and appeared
for Muir in Case No. 5719 immediately after the filing of the Complaint (R. 18
in Case No. 5719, which is separately paginated).
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A.

By Filing Her Case in Grand County, Plaintiff
Waived Any Objection to Venue in Grand County,

It would be strange indeed if a plaintiff, having selected
venue in Grand County and prosecuted the case there for 18 months
prior to the first appeal, should be permitted to object to her
own selection of venue.

A defendant in similar circumstances

would be held to have waived the objection, and a plaintiff
should be held to the same standard.
Timeliness of a motion to change venue is controlled by
statute.

The statute provides:

If the county in which the action is commenced is
not the proper county for the trial thereof, the action
may nevertheless be tried therein, unless the defendant
at the time he answers or otherwise appears files a motion, in writing, that the trial be had in the proper
county.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-8 (emphasis added).
As an initial matter, plaintiff's case did not qualify for
change of venue because the county in which the action was commenced, Grand County, was undisputedly a proper location for
trial.
County.

Defendant Burt's principal place of business was in Grand
(R. 2, 66.)

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7.

Even if venue had not initially been proper in Grand County,
plaintiff waived the defect by filing the case in Grand County.
Under the statute and controlling case law, a party seeking
change of venue must request the change at the party's first appearance in the case.
1103 (1930).

Pace v. Wolfe, 76 Utah 368, 289 P. 1102,

Making any other motion or appearance in the case

prior to moving for change of venue forecloses the party from
-19-

thereafter objection to venue.

Cannon v. Tuft/ 3 Utah 2d 410,

285 P.2d 843, 845 (1955).
In this case, plaintiff prosecuted the case in the district
court for 18 months before the initial motion to dismiss was
granted and the first notice of appeal filed.

The motion to

change venue was not filed until after the case was remitted to
the trial court following the appeal.

Plaintiff has clearly

waived any right to object to having her case heard in Grand
County.
B.

Plaintiff's Motion to Change Venue to Davis County
Could Not Be Granted Because Davis County Was Not
a Proper Place for Trial.

Plaintiff asked that venue be transferred to Davis County,
yet Davis County was not a proper place for trial under the applicable venue statute.

The statute provides that "the action

must be tried in the county in which the cause of action arises,
or in the county in which any defendant resides at the commencement of the action . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7.
This action arose in Duchesne County, where the accident occurred.

Venue would have been proper in Duchesne County or in

Grand County, where defendant Burt had its principal place of
business.

(R. 2, 66.)

Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7.

Plaintiff asserts that the cause of action arose in Davis
County because the sale of explosives occurred there.
sertion is incorrect.

That as-

Plaintiff had no cause of action until the
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injury occurred, and thus the cause of action arose in Duchesne
County.
There is no Utah authority deciding where a cause of action
in tort arises for purposes of determining venue.

In a contract

action, however, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the cause
of action does not arise until a breach has occurred.
Bach, 17 Utah 435, 53 P. 991, 992 (1898).

Brown v.

The place where the

"act without which no right of recovery could exist" occurs is
the place where the cause of action arises.

Id.

In a tort case, injury and damage are necessary elements of
the claim.

See Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 894, 897 (Utah 1993);

Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985).

Thus, injury

and damage are the last acts to occur "without which no cause of
action could exist."

Brown, 53 P. at 992. The cause of action

arises where and when the final acts of injury and damage occur.
Other states have applied this reasoning to tort cases. In
Bergin v. Temple, 111 Mont. 539, 111 P.2d 286 (1941), the Montana
Supreme Court held that a cause of action "arises" for venue purposes when "the plaintiff has a right to institute a judicial
proceeding," and that in a tort case the occurrence of damage is
the final act necessary to complete the cause of action.
P.2d at 289.

Ill

Thus, the cause of action "arises" where and when

injury occurs.

Ld. at 290.

See also Ebell v. Seapac Fisheries,

Inc., 692 P.2d 956, 958 (Alaska 1984) (claim arises where harmful
force first takes effect); Russell v. Marenakos Logging Co., 61
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Wash. 2d 761, 380 P.2d 744, 748 (1963) (automobile accident claim
arises at the site of the accident).
This analysis is consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's
treatment of the accrual of claims for statute of limitations
purposes.

Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Investment,

Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 19 (Utah 1990) ("in the case of personal injury . . . the cause of action arises only when the injury occurs"); Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 684-85 (Utah
1985) (cause of action for products liability does not arise until injury occurs).
Plaintiff's reliance on Schramm-Johnson, Drugs v. Cox, 79
Utah 276, 9 P.2d 399 (1932), is misplaced.

In that case, the

court speculated in dictum that venue might properly be laid in
the county of sale of animal vaccine because the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in filling an order for
sheep vaccine with horse vaccine.

9 P.2d at 401.

In the case at

bar, no negligence is alleged in connection with the sale itself,
so venue would not lie in the county of sale even under the
Schramm-Johnson dictum.
C.

Plaintiff's Claim That Her Choice of Venue Prevented Her from Attending Trial Is Without Merit.

Plaintiff claims that she was physically ill and thus unable
to attend trial.

The trial court properly rejected plaintiff's

argument because it was not supported by competent evidence.
(R. 925.)
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There was no evidence in the record to support plaintiff's
claim that she was physically unable to attend trial in Grand
County.

The only support plaintiff offered for her position was

an unsworn letter from Dr. Dennis D. Harper, D.O., stating that
"requiring [plaintiff] to live in a motel and eat in restaurants
in Moab will increase her stress and will probably worsen her
condition."

(R. 512.)

The district court's reasoning was appropriate and within
its sound discretion:
The Court is not convinced by the unsworn statement of Dennis D. Harper, D.O., that Muir would be unable to attend a trial in Grand County, Utah. The
statement indicates that Muir has suffered this malady
for two and one-half years, yet Muir did not raise this
ground in her first motion for change of venue. The
Court is not aware of any authority for changing the
place of trial because of poor health of a party.
(R. 925.)
Finally, it is appropriate to note that the decision of the
jury was based upon a finding of no liability.

Thus, any error

in the court's decision would have been harmless, as plaintiff's
alleged inability to appear merely prevented her from offering
testimony on the damages aspect of the case.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED THE VERDICT
IN DEFENDANTS' FAVOR ON THE NEGLIGENCE AND
BREACH OF WARRANTY CLAIMS.
Plaintiff utterly fails to point to any evidence in the record which could have supported the jury in finding in plaintiff's
favor on the claims of negligent failure to warn and breach of
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the implied warranty of merchantability.

The plaintiff had the

burden to establish the elements of these claims by competent
evidence, and the issues were resolved on the complete failure of
the plaintiff to do so.
Moreover, on appeal the plaintiff failed to order any part
of the transcript.

Defendants ordered certain parts of the tran-

script in order to support their position.

The plaintiff, how-

ever, can point to no evidence in the record on appeal which
could possibly have supported her claims.

It was the plaintiff's

obligation to provide the Court of Appeals with a record to support plaintiff's claims.
Procedure.

Rule 11(e) (2), Utah Rules of Appellate

The plaintiff's failure to do so requires the Court

of Appeals to presume the correctness of the disposition made by
the trial court.
App. 1992).

State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150, 152-53 (Utah

"Absent the trial transcript, the claim of error is

merely an unsupported, unilateral allegation which we cannot resolve."

Mark VII Financial Consultants Corp. v. Smedley, 7 92

P.2d 130, 134 (Utah App. 1992) .
Regardless of the deficiencies in the record on appeal,
there was simply no evidence presented to the trial court which
could have supported findings in plaintiff's favor on the issues
of failure to warn and breach of warranty.
cussed separately below.
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Those issues are dis-

A,

The Court Correctly Directed the Verdict on the
Failure to Warn Claim.

Insofar as it is possible to determine what plaintiff claims
with regard to failure to warn, it appears that plaintiff claims
that defendants should have warned plaintiff that he should not
attempt to manually light 25 to 30 sticks of dynamite, in a dark
mine, within a period of three minutes.
There is no duty to warn of obvious dangers.
Almost any chattel or commodity is capable of inflicting injury; knives cut, axes split, dynamite explodes,
food spoils, poison kills. Where the danger is obvious
and known to the user, no warning is necessary and no
liability attaches for an injury occurring from the
reasonable hazards attached to the use of chattels or
commodities; but where the dangerous condition is latent it should be disclosed to the user, and nondisclosure should subject the maker or supplier to liability for creating an unreasonable risk.
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 505 (8th Cir.
1968).

Cf. Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865,

868 (Utah 1981) (no duty to warn an invitee of an obvious danger) .
It is difficult to conceive a more obvious danger than the
danger the plaintiff's decedent encountered.

The court correctly

decided that there was no duty to warn him of this danger.
Moreover, there was overwhelming and unrebutted evidence in
the record that extensive warnings were given which specifically
addressed Muir's misuse of the product. Muir and Bailey had at
least two copies of the Do's and Don't' s (Ex. 8). In addition,
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Wallace Muir purchased (Ex. 6) a copy of the DuPont Blaster's
Handbook (Ex. 11).
Bailey and Muir violated many of the warnings and instructions contained in the Dof s and Donf tf s.

These include the fol-

lowing:
USING EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR
PRIMERS
GENERAL
• Never prepare more primers than immediately
needed.
(Ex. 8, p. 6.)

Muir and Bailey had extra primers of different

lengths laying around, creating the risk that a short fuse may be
used by mistake in a dark mine.
Muir and Bailey also violated the following warnings and instructions contained in the Do's and Don/t's:
USING EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS: GENERAL PRECAUTIONS
• • • •

• Always fire the shot from a position
outside
the blast area away from an area where flyrock
might occur.
•

• • •

• Never fire the shot from in front

of the blast.

(Ex. 8, p. 10 (emphasis in original).)
USING EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS: FUSE DETONATOR AND SAFETY
FUSE INITIATION
• • • •

STEPS FOR ASSEMBLING FUSE DETONATOR AND FUSE
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Step 3:
Measure correct length of fuse from roll
and cut squarely across with a fuse cutter designed for this purpose; not a
knife.

LIGHTING SAFETY FUSE
Step 1:
Make sure you can reach a safe location
after lighting with sufficient time before initiation.
Step 2:
Place sufficient stemming over the explosive material to protect it from fuse-generated
heat and sparks.
Step 3:
Have a partner before lighting the fuse.
One person should light the fuse, and the other
should time and monitor the burn.
Step 4:
Light the safety fuse, using a specially
designed lighter:
Single-fuse
ignition - hot wire lighters,
pull-wire lighters or thermalite connectors.
Multiple-fuse
ignition - igniter cord with
thermalite connectors.
• Always light fuse with a fuse lighter designed
for the purpose.
•

Always use the "buddy system" when lighting
safety fuse - one lights the fuse, the other
times and monitors.

• Never use matches,
cigarette
lighters,
rettes,
pipes,
cigars,
carbide lamps,
unsafe means to ignite safety fuse.

cigaor other

(Ex. 8, pp. 13-15 (emphasis in original).)
In addition to the foregoing warnings, Muir purchased a copy
of the Blaster's Handbook.

Although the document was not re-

ceived in its entirety into evidence, many portions of it were
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read into the record.

The warnings were similar to and consis-

tent with the warnings given in the Do's and D o n f t f s .
On the basis of this record, there was no evidence upon
which a jury, acting reasonably, could have found that defendants
were required to, and did not, warn Muir of the obvious danger he
knowingly and voluntarily encountered.
B.

The Court Correctly Directed the Verdict on the
Breach of Warranty Claim.

Plaintiff also alleged that the fuse failed to comply with
the implied warranty of merchantability.

Plaintiff concedes that

no notice of breach of warranty was given until the complaint was
filed.

(Appellant's brief, at 25.)

More importantly, plaintiff

failed to offer any evidence whatsoever to show that the fuse was
not merchantable.
The elements of the implied warranty of merchantability are
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-314(2):
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the
contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair
average quality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the
agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within
each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
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(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of
fact made on the container or label if any.
Plaintiff contends that the jury could have found that one
of the fuses "completed its burn prematurely."

However, plain-

tiff failed to offer any evidence to support that contention.
Plaintiff simply invites the court to allow the jury to speculate
that the fuse completed its burn prematurely and that the fuse
did so because of some hypothetical but unsubstantiated defect.
The plaintiff was not entitled to have such speculation submitted
to the jury, and the court properly directed the verdict on this
claim as well.
STATEMENT REGARDING CALENDAR ASSIGNMENT
Apache does not believe that this case raises any significant or complex issues of law and that the case can be resolved
within existing and controlling precedent.

Accordingly, Apache

believes this case is appropriate for assignment to the memorandum decision calendar.
CONCLUSION
Appellee Apache Nitrogen Products requests that the Court of
Appeals affirm the decision of the district court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

Q

day of January, 1995.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
Rodney K. Parker
Attorneys for Appellee Apache
Nitrogen Products
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